A Real-Time Test: How Europe’s Election Protection Failed
Balkan Free Media Initiative and Sensika publish the second edition of the TikTokcracy Tracker, monitoring the digital information environment around Bulgaria’s parliamentary elections on April 19.
Platforms act inconsistently and selectively in countering election manipulation. Institutions in Bulgaria and the EU respond slowly, while political actors adapt faster on all sides. This is one of the conclusions of the second TikTokcracy Tracker by Balkan Free Media Initiative (BFMI) and Sensika Technologies. The monitoring of social media during the pre-election period represents a real-time test of the European mechanism for protecting elections.
BFMI and Sensika documented manipulation techniques already in the first TikTokcracy Tracker. They reported them to the platforms, tracked their response, and measured the impact in real time.
The result is clear. TikTok acted partially and with delay. Meta acted without disclosing what exactly it did. Institutions did not respond effectively.
Manipulation is distributed, not concentrated
The second edition of the TikTokcracy Tracker covers the period from March 16 to April 12, 2026.
It documents the use of coordinated networks on TikTok and Facebook and presents data on artificial amplification of content visibility across five of the main political actors participating in the elections. Methods and platforms differ, ranging from the creation of structured TikTok networks to the use of networks of Facebook groups and pages.
Among the networks supporting Rumen Radev are older groups that have been renamed. Some were previously pro-Russian, while others had been used by different political actors or for commercial purposes.
The presence of these patterns across almost the entire competitive spectrum is a persistent feature of the information environment around these elections.
This is not a “Romanian moment.” Manipulation in Bulgaria is not concentrated around a single candidate supported by a single coordinated network.
TikTok response: measurable but incomplete
TikTok removed 34 accounts linked to DPS–NN, the party of Delyan Peevski, who is sanctioned under the U.S. Magnitsky Act.
Five impersonation pages were also removed. In its official statement, the platform confirmed that the network had created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives in support of DPS–NN in the context of the parliamentary elections in Bulgaria.
Data shows that the number of users reached by content related to Progressive Bulgaria and DPS–NN decreased by around 50 percent.
During the same period, accounts linked to Vazrazhdane and MECH began to register anomalous patterns.
Meta response: no transparency
Meta has not made a public statement about specific actions related to the Bulgarian elections.
In its official response to BFMI, the company stated that it had formed a specialized team of Bulgarian-speaking staff and had acted against accounts violating its rules based on partner reports. The company did not disclose how many accounts were affected or under what criteria.
Documented patterns on Facebook include a network of more than 30 pages and groups linked to Progressive Bulgaria. Among them are previously pro-Russian pages, as well as pages previously associated with other political actors, some of which were renamed and repurposed into pro-Radev assets within a single day.
On April 6, the independent outlet Factcheck.bg documented a network of around 120 AI-generated fake profiles distributing content related to ITN. In some cases, nearly half of the shares originated from these inauthentic accounts.
Meta defines coordinated inauthentic behaviour more narrowly than BFMI and Sensika. Coordinated activity that does not rely on fake identities may fall outside its enforcement scope, even when it is intentional and strategic.
Institutional framework exists, capacity does not
Bulgaria designated the Communications Regulation Commission as Digital Services Coordinator through amendments to the Electronic Communications Act in November 2025.
The caretaker government requested that the European Commission activate the Rapid Response System.
The system is automatically activated during elections in the EU for platforms that have signed the Code of Practice on Disinformation. However, platforms are not required to take specific action based on reported signals.
The only measurable result in this election cycle was achieved through civil society reporting to platforms rather than through formal mechanisms under the Digital Services Act.
Designating a coordinator is a necessary but not sufficient step. The operational capacity required to engage platforms under the DSA, including structured evidence, access to data, and regulatory pressure, was not developed at the pace required by the election calendar.
The system was activated without the conditions for which it was designed.
Backfire effect
The government’s announcement of the activation of the Rapid Response System triggered a strong backlash.
A network of websites linked to RT and the Russian state disinformation ecosystem promoted the narrative that the EU was interfering in Bulgaria’s elections through censorship tools.
The EU’s official counter-disinformation tool EUvsDisinfo identified and debunked the claim on April 6, but the response did not reach a broad audience in Bulgaria.
The narrative was picked up by dozens of Bulgarian websites, some of which are known for spreading disinformation. The simultaneous publication of identical texts indicates a high level of coordination across multiple networks. These materials were further amplified through social media.
The fact that the EU responded publicly to this narrative confirms that the coordinated disinformation campaign around these elections reached a level requiring an official response.
Distorted reality
Bulgarian voters will go to the polls on April 19 in an information environment where they lack reliable means to distinguish manipulated engagement from authentic political activity.
Failures in the response of platforms, national authorities, and the EU provide critical lessons for future elections and for digital regulation in the European Union.
About TikTokcracy Tracker
TikTokcracy Tracker is a joint project of Balkan Free Media Initiative (BFMI) and Sensika Technologies for real-time monitoring of the digital information environment around elections in Bulgaria.
Monitoring will continue after April 19, and the methodology will be applied to upcoming elections across the Balkans in 2026.
